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or disapprove them, and that nothing in the CWA divests EPA of
jurisdiction to approve a state submitted TMDL once EPA issues its
own. The court dismissed this claim without leave to amend and with
prejudice.
Arcadia's second claim for relief challenged the validity of a "de
facto TMDL procedure." This procedure consisted of the initial
issuance of TMDLs by the Regional Board; second, EPA's own issuance
of TMDLs; third, State Board approval of the Regional Board TMDL;
fourth, submittal of the State Board TMDL to EPA; and finally, the
eventual "superseding" of EPA's TMDLs by the State approved TMDLs.
Arcadia asserted that they suffered from the effectuation of the de
facto TMDL procedure, and that they would suffer from the
procedure in the future. EPA argued that the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 permits challenges only
to "final agency action," and that the TMDL procedure was not an
agency action, let alone a final agency action. The court agreed with
EPA and dismissed the second claim without leave to amend and with
prejudice.
Arcadia also asserted under the second claim a challenge on the
merits of EPA's approval of the State Trash TMDLs. EPA moved to
dismiss this claim as unripe for judicial review because the State Trash
TMDLs did not impose any obligations on Arcadia. The court agreed
with Arcadia and dismissed this claim as unripe for judicial review.
Arcadia's third claim for relief sought a declaration under the
Declaratory Judgment Act as to which party's interpretation of the law
was correct and ajudicial determination of Arcadia's rights and duties.
However, since Arcadia's third claim relied completely on the first two
claims, which the court dismissed, the court likewise dismissed the
third claim. In sum, the court dismissed all actions that Arcadia
brought against EPA.
BrettJohnson

Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (N.D.
Cal. 2003) (holding district court had jurisdiction over claim under
the Administrative Procedure Act where the Clean Water Act did not
subject the regulation to circuit court review, and Administrative
Procedure Act's six-year statute of limitations did not bar the claim).
On July 24, 2001, the Environmental Protection Information
Center ("EPIC") filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California alleging that the Pacific Lumber
Company and Scotia Pacific Lumber Company (collectively "PALCO")
violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by discharging pollutants from
timber harvesting and road construction activity into Bear Creek
without a CWA permit. PALCO moved to dismiss the suit, based in
part on a silvicultural regulation promulgated by the Environmental
In effect, this regulation removed
Protection Agency ("EPA").
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nonpoint source silvicultural activities from National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit requirements. EPIC
filed an amended complaint adding the EPA as a defendant for
attacking the nonpoint source provision of the regulation.
Specifically, EPIC alleged that the regulation was ultra vires, as well as
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in
accordance with the law under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). EPA and PALCO argued that the court lacked jurisdiction
over EPIC's claim, and that the APA's six-year statute of limitations
barred the claim.
The court explained that the APA authorizes judicial review of
final agency action if no other adequate remedy exists in a court. The
EPA and PALCO claimed that the CWA allowed EPIC to bring its
claim in the circuit courts; therefore, EPIC could not have brought its
claim in the district court. To make their argument, the EPA and
PALCO claimed that the silvicultural regulation invoked circuit court
jurisdiction under certain sections of the CWA that govern NPDES
permitting requirements, and that circuit courts should review any
agency activity related to the NPDES program. EPIC countered, and
the court agreed, that since the regulation removed silvicultural
activities from NPDES permitting, the CWA sections cited by the EPA
did not support circuit court review of the regulation. The court
found unpersuasive the EPA and PALCO's argument that all activity
related to NPDES permitting improperly expanded the CWA's
jurisdiction; in fact, the court determined that the regulation did not
involve NPDES permitting.
Next, the EPA and PALCO argued that the applicable CWA section
governing agency approval or promulgation of effluent limitations
mandates direct appellate review of the action by the circuit courts.
Specifically, they alleged that the silvicultural regulation fell under this
section because in NRDC v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit found reviewable a
set of regulations that included the silvicultural regulation. However,
EPIC's argument that the silvicultural regulation was not specifically
challenged, nor specifically reviewed, by the D.C. Circuit in NRDC v.
EPA persuaded the court. The court also held the silvicultural
regulation was not an effluent limitation, and applicable CWA
provisions allowing direct appellate review of such actions did not
govern the regulation.
Lastly, the EPA and PALCO advanced policy reasons for circuit
court review of the silvicultural regulation. Specifically, the EPA and
PALCO argued that generalized rules are better suited for circuit court
review. However, the court was wary to expand CWA jurisdiction as
broadly as the EPA and PALCO proposed. In addition, the court
reasoned that because the D.C. Circuit previously took jurisdiction
over the original silvicultural regulation in NRDC v. Train, it was able
to take jurisdiction over the regulation as well.
The EPA and PALCO also argued that the APA's six-year statute of
limitations barred EPIC's claim. PALCO specifically argued that no
final agency action occurred within the time limit; and while the EPA
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acknowledged that a final agency action may have occurred, it argued
that the only reviewable action was a 2000 decision not to amend the
regulation-not the regulation itself. Since the 2000 EPA decision
marked the end of the agency's decisionmaking process, the court
held that the decision qualified as a final agency action. In response to
the EPA's argument, EPIC claimed it was bringing an "as applied"
action; or in the alternative, that the 2000 decision not to amend the
regulation opened the provision open for review, and therefore, open
The court found EPIC's "as applied" argument
to challenge.
unpersuasive since EPIC had not been the object of any EPA
enforcement proceeding, nor had EPIC directly petitioned the EPA to
amend the regulation. However, the court agreed with EPIC that the
2000 action opened the regulation to challenge since the agency
reconsidered the entire issue at the time and invited comments on the
provision. Thus, because the final agency action occurred on July 13,
2000, and the EPIC filed its complaint on July 24, 2001, the court held
that the action fell within the six-year statute of limitations.
Kate 0. Lively

Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (holding that, under the Clean Water Act, a claim alleging
increased logging in a watershed created increased sediment in a
creek and alleging ditch use to discharge storm water and pollutants
stated a claim for which relief could be granted).
Pacific Lumber Company and Scotia Pacific Lumber Company
("Lumber Companies") owned land located in a watershed the
Lumber Companies used primarily for logging. The Environmental
Protection Information Center ("EPIC") brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California against the
Lumber Companies, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") Administrator, and the EPA. EPIC claimed the
Lumber Companies discharged pollutants without obtaining a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit.
EPIC asserted the Lumber Companies violated the Clean Water Act
("CWA") by logging in a watershed causing a large increase in
sediment deposited into Bear Creek. The EPIC further argued the
Lumber Companies were using culverts and drainage ditches to
discharge pollutants and storm water, creating a point source under
the CWA. The Lumber Companies filed a motion to dismiss, asserting
EPIC's complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be
granted.
The first issue was whether discharging storm water via culverts and
The CWA
ditches constituted a point source under the CWA.
prohibits discharging pollutants from a point source into the navigable
waters of the United States without an NPDES permit. The CWA
defines a point source as a discernable conveyance from various

